Another unknown number, of those Tehran alleges were complicit, are awaiting execution,and the Iranian press reports officials as stating that some 20 per cent of the culprits have yet to be arrested.Outside supportTehran maintains that senior militant ethnic Arabs reside outside the country and benefitfrom the backing of Western intelligence services which, in alliance with former Iraqi Baathists,are attempting to foment ethnic unrest in the region as part of the wider West-Iran standoff.The Baath party of Iraq was the principal patron of Iran’s Arab separatists from the early1970s and ‘liberating’ Khuzestan was one of Saddam Hussein’s stated goals when he invadedIran in 1980. Colluding with foreigners is most likely the principal charge that will be levelledagainst Mansouri.Minister of the Interior Mostafa Purmohammadi said on 13 August that while “good co-ordination and suitable measures by the security apparatus” have significantly reduced violencesince 2005, “remnants of terrorist groups are active and they are supported by foreign services,especially the US, Britain and Israel”. Purmohammadi also claimed that “a large number ofthese people were identified and their weapons depots were discovered”. Most confiscated armshave been pistols, Kalashnikov rifles and ammunitions.Meanwhile, public hanging of Arab militants implicated in violence has become thenorm, with the clear aim of acting as a deterrent. Iraq is cited as the operational base foranti-regime groups as they are perceived to be able to benefit from the patronage of US andUK militaries and operate from the vicinity of Khuzestan. Moreover, potential recruits canalso be found among the estimated 5,500 Iranian ethnic Arabs who still live as refugees inAd Diwaniyah, Ali al Gharbi and Al Kumayt in eastern Iraq. Many of these refugees fled Iran in1979 after an ethnic Arab uprising on the back of the Iranian Revolution was crushed by Admiral Ahmad Madani. Others subsequently had to flee after siding with Saddam Hussein’s regime and collaborated with its intelligence services during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Camp Ashraf, north of Baghdad, is also hosting some 2,900 members of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, an Iranian Islamist-Marxist group which relocated to Iraq in 1985 after siding with Saddam Hussein.Tehran has pointed the finger at MEK for some of the violence in Khuzestan.It is difficult to verify the identity and size of the various purported and self-styled groupsclaiming to represent Iran’s ethnic Arabs. This is due to a high degree of flux and overlap ofpolitical platforms in this community. The four most prominent separatist organisations are:ALO, which is based in the Netherlands; the Ahwazi-Arab People’s Democratic Front, whichis based in London; and the National Liberation Movement of Ahwaz and the Ahwazian ArabLiberation Front, both of which operate from Canada.However, most ethnic Arab activists advocate the establishment of a federal system in Iran,within which Khuzestan’s Arabs can benefit from autonomy. The most noted federalist organisation is the Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz (DSPA), an entity that was set up in 2002 and is part of an umbrella coalition of Iranian ethnic opposition groups. Unlike the separatist Arab groups, whose literature is dominated by either pan-Arabism or Islamist slogans, the DSPA promotes itself as a secular and social democratic outfit that denounces violence, with its greatest appeal being to the intelligentsia inside Khuzestan. The DSPA has also secured considerable support from European Social Democratic and Green parties and is active at fora hosted by the UN.The DSPA’s strategy is a reflection of broader ethnic Arab sentiment in Khuzestan. While callsfor better living conditions are commonplace, Source: IHS January 2008 l Jane’s Intelligence Review l jir.janes.com 55 RESOURCE WATCHonly a small minority of ethnic Arabs appear willing to resort to violence or seek to secedefrom Iran. The separatist path was an option during the Iran-Iraq War, and yet a clear majority in Khuzestan, Persian and Arab alike, fought the invading Iraqi army.Socio-economic motivation While successive Iranian governments have traditionallyattributed ethnic militancy to foreign agitation, socio-economic problems of Khuzestanare an undeniable factor behind much of the present local Arab resentment.With unemployment rampant, particularly among Arabs, Tehran is also accused of a rangeof transgressions, from forced land appropriation, hostility toward Arab customs and blockingschool education in Arabic to unspoken discriminatory policies that bar Arabs from certainhigh-level functions. The charge against ethnic Persians is that they view ethnic Arabs as a fifth column, and that Tehran prefers subjugation over inclusion.Such critiques are a reality that officials in Tehran are increasingly inclined to accept openly. Khuzestan’s 17 (out of 290)deputies in the parliament in Tehran often publicly highlight economic deprivation in the province and the government’s failures to address grievances. The province suffered tremendously during the Iran-Iraq war and reconstruction effortshave been slow to non-existent. Calls by Khuzestan’s local authorities to receive a larger shareof the oil wealth have been refused. A bill submitted by Khuzestan’s deputies to allocate 1.5per cent of total oil export revenues to the province has been repeatedly defeated in the parliament in Tehran. As a result, Khuzestan’s share of the oil revenue remains below this level, as the central government retains some revenue and then allocates the remainder equally among all 30 provinces. When oil pipelines and infrastructure have been targeted, as in 2005 and 2006, the culprits have left behind leaflets stating that no one would benefit from the oil revenue unless ethnic Arabs receive a fairer share.A 2006 report by the UN Economic and Social Council on Iran highlighted ethnic disparitieson different levels in Khuzestan. The Iranian parliament’s own research arm, the IslamicMajlis Centre for Research, stated in a 2006 report that swift anti-poverty action was requiredto foil future unrest akin to that experienced in Ahvaz in 2005, when fears over an alleged programme to relocate Persians to Khuzestan led to riots that left an unknown number dead. It cited unemployment as a major danger, given that Arab youth are most inclined to be receptive to radical ideas. Political disillusionment also underpins much of the militant momentum.Economic deprivation is therefore a major source of Arab disaffection, compounded bya lack of political representation. While Khuzestan has favoured reformist candidates in parliamentary and presidential elections, the growing sentiment is that the political system cannot be reformed from within. President MahmoudAhmadinejad, for example, did not appoint any Arabs to his cabinet, unlike his reformistpredecessor, Mohammed Khatami, who had Ali Shamkhani, an ethnic Arab, as his defenceminister.One of the results of this disenchantment with the Shia clerical establishment in Tehranis the emergence of a trend among Khuzestan’s overwhelmingly Shia Arabs to convert to SunniIslam, a phenomenon never before experienced in contemporary Iran. While sectarian violenceis minimal at the moment, there are warning signs. In June, Hesham Seimori, a mid-rankingShia cleric in Ahvaz known for his anti-Saudi and anti-Salafi preaching was killed by unidentified gunmen.Critics of Tehran’s policies also argue that in Khuzestan, communities largely comprised ofethnic Persians tend to be the primary beneficiarie of government policies and aid. For example, some two decades after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, de-mining occurs mainly whenlarger energy projects are implemented but not when local small Arab farming communitiesneed access to agricultural land. The energy industry in the province, the recipient of the bulkof government investment, is primarily staffed by ethnic Persians.Tehran’s responseTo mitigate further unrest, the supreme leader has stated that he will personally oversee development plans, and the government of President Ahmadinejad has vowed to hold a special session on the province. Tehran’s fiscal allocation for Khuzestan in 2008 specifically targets development in tribal and rural areas, where ethnic Arabs tend to live.Parallel to promises of more economic regeneration, Tehran is seeking political assurances.In September, elders from Iran’s Arab tribes met Ayatollah Musavi-Jazayeri, the provincialrepresentative of the supreme leader, and renewed their pledge of allegiance to Ali Khamenei.Meanwhile, Jafari, the new IRGC and Basij commander, has already replaced a number oflocal IRGC officials in Khuzestan, including in the strategically vital cities of Abadan and Khorramshahr.The Basij Islamist militia is also on a recruitment drive in Khuzestan, with a recordnumber of military parades and events in 2007 aimed to stimulate a sense of Iranian nationalism. Tehran’s efforts to include ethnic Arabs in a dialogue would be a much more welcome development than to dismiss all critics and acts of militancy as the creation of externalpowers. While not discounting possible foreign assistance to ethnic Iranian militants, socio-economic realities in Khuzestan speak for themselves. It is also true that Arab disgruntlementis near identical to other ethnic minorities such as Kurdsand Baluchis. Still, Khuzestan’s strategic economic status setsit apart. Further deterioration of relations between the centralgovernment in Tehran and ethnic Arabs most likely will resultin more violence in Khuzestan, and expose its vital energy-relatedassets to possible attacks and sabotage, as in 2005.Such a scenario would have considerable ramifications for oil markets. Iran’s oil reservesare the second largest in the world after Saudi Arabia, with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) putting it at 136.3 billion barrels. Iran also remains OPEC’s secondlargest producer and the world’s fourth largest oil exporter. Many of the pipelines that supplythe Kharg Island oil terminal, Iran’s main export outlet, travel across Khuzestan.However, emerging militancy in Khuzestan is not inevitable. While a limited number ofArab activists seek independence, most of Iran’s Arabs see themselves as Iranians and are aspiring for a fairer political representation and economic distribution of resources. Tehran still has time to defuse a potentially disastrous crisis. n1. Khuzestan: Iran’s Achilles’ heel?2. Anger among Iran’s Arabs3. Natural Resources/IranAuthorAlex Vatanka is Jane’s security editor inWashington DC.RELATED ARTICLESWWW.JANES.COMSearch for these articles atwww.janes.com‘Iran’s oil reserves are thesecond largest in the world,with OPEC putting it at136.3 billion barrels’
